Contemporary Cultural Capital: Two New Tendencies
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Thirty years after Distinction was published in French, and almost fifty years after Bourdieu began to deploy the idea, the concept of cultural capital has become one of the most widely used in the social sciences. This paper argues for a sensibility for new tendencies and emerging forms of cultural capital. It is not given that the forms of cultural capital that Bourdieu pointed to will have the same value today. The very content of the concept needs to be revised in light of the very different conditions of the early 21st century. Based on own empirical studies of cultural consumptions in Denmark together with a reading of British, Norwegian and other European studies where the concept of cultural capital is used I will point to two tendencies I think deserve a particular interest: The first is that a knowing mode of appropriation of culture may have become a more important distinguishing feature. The second is that a so-called cosmopolitan attitude within an array of cultural domains also seems to have become a more important as a marker of distinction. The paper will present these ideas; discuss how to name them as well as in which respects they can be seen as contemporary forms of cultural capital.

As some of you may have noticed, Mike Savage and I have published a couple of articles on this topic – one in Poetics named “Updating Cultural Capital Theory” and one in European Societies named “Emerging Forms of Cultural Capital”. Both Mike and I had experience of survey and interview studies on cultural consumptions, from UK and Denmark respectively, and the first article was basically a summing up of our experiences and comparison of our findings. The aim of the second article is to discuss the role and character of cultural capital today, drawing on our own studies as well as a reading of several other, mostly European studies. We start the article with a statement that while the traditional highbrow culture, the most accentuated form of cultural capital in Distinction, seems to play a less significant role in Western societies today, this does not mean that cultural capital has lost importance, as other forms of cultural capital have gained in importance. Omnivorousness has been suggested as one contemporary form of appreciation of culture typically expressed by the educated elites. We do not give support to this hypothesis, but point to three other emerging forms of cultural capital. The emphasis in this paper is on two of these three forms, but I first will briefly sketch the argument leading up to them.

1. The decline of traditional highbrow culture

It is now a commonplace to assert that traditional highbrow culture has faded, and/or that it is not as marked in other nations as it was in France at the time when Distinction was written (cf. Lareau & Weininger 2003, Lamont & Lareau 1988, Lamont 1992, Broady 1998, Danielsen 1998). Some studies find similar patterns as in Distinction, but with far less accent on classical high culture
(Bennett et al. 1999, Rosenlund 2009, Heikkilä & Rahkonen 2011). In our Danish study, for instance (Prieur et al. 2008), we find that this form of culture does not play an important role, even if these practices and preferences (like theatre, avant-garde literature, classical music, modern art) are situated exactly where one would expect them to be in the social space: among the highly educated. Yet very few also within this group have these preferences and practices exclusively, and most enjoy other kinds of cultural activities, too. Bennett et al (2009) show that there is little evidence that snobbish or culturally elitist preferences have much provenance. Evidence on the tastes of the professional-executive class thus demonstrates “the more or less total elimination of hints of snobbishness or expressions of condescension towards other social classes accompanying a greater attachment to popular culture” (p. 172?). This is not just a question of national differences, as there are indications that traditional high culture has lost recognition also in France (Lahire 2004, Pasquier 2005). High-brow culture does simply not seem to play a decisive role in marking class distinctions in Western countries now.

2. The rise of the cultural omnivore?

If the educated elites’ high-brow culture has lost in importance, this may have paved the way for other forms of appreciation or appropriation of culture. The concept of the cultural omnivore is originally from Peterson & Kern (1996), who in an American study found a decline in “snobbism” as defined in terms of an exclusive penchant for “highbrow” musical genres (defined as classical music and opera) and a corresponding rise in “omnivorousness”, defined as a simultaneous appreciation of both “highbrow” and “lowbrow” genres. This idea has won considerable support (i.e. Bryson 1996, Chan & Goldthorpe 2004, 2005 Jæger & Katz-Gerro 2008, Skarpenes 2007). Together with Mike I argue that the concept of the cultural omnivore is unhelpful for advancing our understanding of contemporary cultural boundaries. Operationally, it needs to define a priori a state of ‘snobbish high culture’ (measured for instance in terms of a liking for classical music and opera) which is then empirically disputed as a means of demonstrating the existence of the omnivore. The related idea that the highly educated should be particularly tolerant, does not find empirical support in our own studies, which show that the supposedly omnivores’ tolerant taste has clear limits, when confronted with particular items from popular culture. In the Danish study (Prieur et al. 2008) the culturally privileged actually were the ones who most explicitly marked distaste for some other groups’ tastes. Bennett et al. (2009) suggest, however, that eclecticism may be a new form of cultural capital, together with the confident handling of classifications (p. 71/chapter 10). Rather than a sign of its demise, openness to diversity is itself a modality of cultural capital, since it is especially highly valued among those in the higher positions. The existence of ‘omnivorousness’ is an indication of the limited purchase of traditional notions of classical high culture, but these developments can be better theorised as a kind of self-reflexive appropriation of culture to which I will turn in a moment.

3. Has a scientific culture gained a more legitimate position?
Bourdieu’s analysis in *Distinction* focuses on the arts and humanities, saying relatively little about the role of scientific and technical orientations. At the time he wrote, the sciences could largely be seen as embodying the Kantian aesthetic, as a form of scholarly inquiry based on abstraction. However, in the intervening period technical devices and forms have proliferated, notably in the forms of information technology. The nature of educational curricula in universities has changed radically with the expansion of areas of applied and technical study (for instance in business and management). In the article, Mike and I suggest that these shifts should lead us to understand contemporary cultural capital less through its association with the tradition canon of humanities oriented high culture, but more through an association with scientific expertise, technology, information systems, and more generally the capacities to handle methods of various kinds. A commercialized culture has become very widely shared, and familiarity with digital communication has become increasingly significant in the daily lives of the educated professional and managerial classes. Actually, Bourdieu suggested in some of his later works (in *Reflexive Sociology* (1992 p. 119) but before that in *State Nobility* (1996 p 368)) that the term cultural capital should be replaced by *informational capital*, which he considered a broader or more general term. This term would also link more clearly to the processes of conversion to economic, social or symbolic capital (he uses the term in *State Nobility* in a discussion of the domination of banks in the financial field). This point was thus stated before the impact of the internet could be known, but has probably gained validity through this development. Surprisingly, despite the extensive discussion of the characteristics of ‘information society’ (e.g. Webster 2000; Lash 2004), this concept has not been investigated empirically.

I will now turn to the two remaining emergent tendencies in our article, which are the ones I want to develop further on today: what we with some hesitations have termed a knowing mode of appropriation of culture and what we, also quite hesitantly, have termed cosmopolitanism. I will discuss the naming later, as it is not unproblematic.

### 4. A knowing mode of appropriation of culture

Compared to the society analysed by Bourdieu in *Distinction*, the number of possible aesthetic choices has expanded enormously in Western societies today. Mass media’s increased presence in everyday life subjects us all to more information on the range of possible choices, and exposes us to a new and shorter time horizon. What is fashionable today may be “so yesterday” already tomorrow, while signs of vulgarity may just as rapidly become “cool”. The cultural production has been through enormous changes, and they are of course reflected in the cultural consumption. These changes may imply a certain displacement of how distinction is achieved, with less emphasis on the choices of particular objects and more on the way to relate to these objects. The choice of objects may not correspond too well to the Kantian pure taste dissected by Bourdieu, but the somewhat distanced attitude towards them does. It is thus possible that the privileged may relate to this proliferation of choices in particularly ‘discerning’ ways.
Holt has argued that the (1997 p. 103) “crux of the postmodern condition is the breakdown of the hierarchy distinguishing legitimate ‘high’ culture from mass ‘low’ culture,” as well as the breakdown of the direct relationship between such classifications and class. This implies that the objectified form of cultural capital loses efficacy as a mechanism for exclusionary class boundaries: “As popular cultural objects become aestheticized and as elite objects become popularized, the objectified form of cultural capital has in large part been supplanted by the embodied form.” Holt continued (p. 103-104): “In other words, to express distinction through embodied tastes leads cultural elites to emphasize the distinctiveness of consumption practices themselves, apart from the cultural contents to which they are applied”. In order to not be simple followers of fashion, they strive to be updated on the upcoming. Knowledge of particular objects, like restaurants or dishes, is not enough, as they are constantly changing. What is needed is to participate and to have “conversational competence in this specialized, esoteric, and dynamic aesthetic” (p. 104).

Bennett et al (2009) point to a “reflexive appropriation” of culture “in a spirit of openness” (p. 194) as a middle classes ideal. All cultural appropriation is reflexive in some sense of the word, but our specific interest is in a particularly distanced and ironic attitude, and also in a particularly verbalized attitude (where the choice of every single item – be it for decoration, for composing a meal, for a personal outfit or other usages – may be explained and accompanied by a long narrative). This involves a ‘knowing’ way of referring to cultural artefacts, which easily slips into ironic references. Savage, Wright and Gayo-Cal (2010) explore the popularity of ‘crap TV’ amongst young British professionals, in which the ability to identify certain programmes in derogatory terms allowed them to show they ‘knew’ the signifiers of taste, with the result that they could watch lowbrow programmes without it being seen to categorise them in derogatory ways (cf. also Gripsrud 1995 on the reception of Dynasty and other soaps).

The Danish study (Prieur et al. 2008) found some signs that this kind of distanced or ironic attitude is fancied among the culturally privileged, especially the young, for instance with the liking of a satirical TV comedy as a particularly significant distinguishing modality in the survey analysis. This comedy (Drengene fra Angora) is seemingly vulgar and coarse, even scatological, but is object of a second order reading, whereby its transgressions appear sophisticated to the public who knows how to decode it.

The subtleties implied in the modes of relation to the cultural objects call for qualitative research techniques. I will give some examples from recent studies of cultural reception.

Friedman and Kuipers (2013) have studied comedy reception in Britain and in the Netherlands. Comedy is in itself a popular and ‘light’ cultural object, evidently aimed at entertainment, so if the cultivated classes use their time on this, it might in itself be sign of a lack of snobbism. Friedman and Kuipers state, however, that even if people with high education may have a broad and seemingly omnivorous taste, including popular culture, they may at the same time be strongly dismissive of lowbrow comedy (p. 180): “these omnivores are also snobs.” They may put an honour in enjoying comedy shows that less educated people will simply not have the tools to decode. They may enjoy jokes that other people would find shocking, as they have the appropriate ironic attitude.
They may classify people who enjoy lowbrow comedy quite harshly – as idiots or as people who have done nothing with their lives. What makes people laugh is regarded as something quite fundamental for their personalities, and thereby as natural criteria both for social bonds and for social boundary drawing.

In a study of French high school pupils’ relations to popular music and movies Legon (2010) comes to expose the shallowness of simple classifications by genres (like those used in most studies drawing conclusions about omnivoruousness). Apparently there is a blurring, as the genres are appreciated across different socioeconomic backgrounds, and also young people from homes with a high level of education have preferences for popular musical genres. While rock is somewhat more coveted among French teenagers from higher classes, and rap among those from more popular classes (Pasquier 2005), Legon shows, however, the fine distinctions in the many different ways of consuming, for instance, rap music. While the teenagers from homes with lower education typically have a preference for the most downloaded music pieces, or the ones transmitted by radio or TV, the teenagers from homes with higher education will more often rely on personal advice, and would like to find the good pieces themselves (“I will not seek to listen to the new rap, the top 10, because, well, I know that’s crap.”).

The classical highbrow style as depicted by Bourdieu can be recognized in Legon’s study, not only in some fine distinctions concerning the choice of objects (like the least popular within a popular genre), but also in the attention for form and not only for function. The pupils from more educated homes will also more often listen to music without doing anything else, “concentrating” on it, they will more often buy the album, and more often even buy vinyl records. The pupils from less educated homes, in contrast, will more often not see the point in having the original album if you can burn it for free. The same logic goes for movies. Those from the most educated homes more often emphasise good acting and a story that makes you think, while those from less educated homes range action relatively higher. The former also make a point of seeing a good movie in a theatre/cinema. Legon also shows that these apparently quite small differences in consumption practices may be sustained by quite harsh classifications of “the others’” taste.

In a recently defended Ph.D. thesis, which is based on 46 thorough interviews in the Norwegian city Stavanger, Vegard Jarness (2013) analyses lifestyle choices within differently positioned groups as well as the groups’ aesthetical and moral boundary drawing towards other groups. To have a broad taste seems to have become the norm for the educated elite. As an example, one of his interviewees, a journalist, makes a point of being able to “combine the high and the low” and move “elegantly between different taste cultures”, and even claim “you are considered weird if you are too strict”, and for instance does not allow oneself to watch reality TV (p. 100). But is this simply a sign of omnivoruousness? Jarness does not think so, as there is absolutely not an ‘anything goes’ attitude about it. They may strive to seek out “quality goods” from vulgar genres, for instance Bollywood films, crime novels or country music (p. 103), and put a pride in the ability to “dig up obscurities” (p. 104), as a high school teacher puts it. These interviewees accentuate a knowing, but also a playful and ironic, mode of appropriation, which they typically put to work when relating to cultural products usually considered as popular, or even as “bad taste” or “kitsch”. A musician appreciates a
particular movie because (p. 106): “It’s so bad it becomes good”, while another musician collects “bad records” because of their expressions of “personality”. Far from the fall of cultural hierarchies this choice of cultural products might reveal, the ironic and distanced way of appropriating these cultural products betrays a clear sense for distinctions. Far from a blurring of boundaries between high and low culture, what we witness is a sophisticated use of what Bourdieu named

Mike and I therefore suggest that the mode of relating to culture may be more important in games of distinction than the precise choice of cultural objects in themselves. We regard this as an alternative to the omnivore-hypothesis, which corresponds better to some empirical observations.

5. An emerging cosmopolitan cultural capital?

I will now consider whether this kind of ‘knowing’ appropriation of culture can be linked to a ‘cosmopolitan’ orientation. In our article, we picked up on claims regarding the cosmopolitan orientations of professionals and managers (e.g. Calhoun 2003), and in particular the important remarks of Fligstein (2008) on how the European middle classes are key agents in the formation of a distinctively European cultural field. We were not claiming that the working classes are ‘immobile’ – as they may have extensive experience of migration, sometimes forced – but rather that the capacity to stand outside one’s own national frame of reference may today be an important cultural marker.

Here again, Holt’s (1997: 112) arguments are useful. He found that his respondents with high level of cultural capital understood their world as more expansive than those with low level did. Many had lived in other states or countries, and they all travelled regularly. “The most powerful expression of cosmopolitan versus local tastes is through perceptions of and desires for the exotic” – within food as well as entertainment.

In Finland Kahma & Toikka (forth.) also found an opposition between “traditional” and “modern” culture, where “traditional” seems to cover basically Finnish culture, and Haikkilä & Rahkonen (2011) found that the Swedish-speaking upper class regarded continental European habits as sophisticated. The tradition of identifying the foreign as the most refined is a point also in Karadag’s (2009) study of transformations in class formation in Turkey.

A similar opposition between an international vs. a local or national orientation was found also in the Danish study, within areas as diverse as TV-preferences, musical likes and food consumption (Prieur et al. 2008), but also in political attitudes (Harrits et al. 2010). This opposition appears through the use of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA, also named GDA: geometric data analysis). I will here use a map of the social space in our Danish city (figure 1) constructed by my colleague Jakob Skjott-Larsen (2012). This space is constructed with the use of variables on the possession of economic and cultural capital as well as on current employment. We can see a structure that positions people with first and foremost high level of education in the upper left quadrant while those with first and foremost a high level of economic capital are situated in the upper right quadrant, and those with lower levels of these capitals in the lower quadrants.
In the next map (figure 2) answers about moral-political attitudes and some lifestyle choices of relevance are superposed on the previous space of social positions. This space betrays a clear opposition that runs along the opposition between high and low level of cultural capital.

On one side, there are individuals who orient themselves globally in different respects: They pay more attention to news about the presidential election in the US than to news about the Danish royal family; they make use of the Internet to seek information and communicate; they have “cosmopolitan” preferences for food (“exotic dishes” rather than “traditional Danish food”) and music (international artists rather than Danish), and these cultural preferences go together with political attitudes like rejecting that one ought to hire natives before immigrants when jobs are scarce; supporting aid to developing countries; and denying any pride in being Danish or of coming from Aalborg. On the other side are people with the opposite attitudes or preferences. And all these choices have, as we can see, a clear connection to capital possession, first and foremost cultural capital.
One might think that whether people prefer local or international dishes and music is not a big deal, but it connects to more fundamental divisions, as become clear when followed up in interviews. In our Danish research project a male engineer talks about the village where he was brought up (Skjott-Larsen 2012: 675): “Well, I’m glad I didn’t stay in [village]. The friends and acquaintances we have there, it’s not like I wouldn’t see them today, but I can see somehow that they’re a little stuck, and there’s no ambition to try anything new.” He later gives the example of some of these friends who cancelled a trip they had planned together to London, and describes them as “too rooted in the local soil”. He talks calmly and matter-of-factly about his old friends, without any arrogance – it is just a banal story about a sense of community that is lost. What is interesting are the implicit oppositions drawn: the countryside against the city, the immobile against the mobile, and being geographically immobile is associated with being mentally stuck.

Most of our Danish interviewees express their distance towards other people only in subtle and rather polite ways. The exception is when the highly educated express their lack of tolerance for intolerant people, in some cases specified as people who vote for the Danish nationalist party (the Danish People’s Party). As a schoolteacher in a managerial position says about the kind of people he avoids at parties (ibid p. 673): “If people are too shallow, too stereotyping, and too loud, and you can see ‘this is not leading to a sensible conversation’. If it is too racist or too discriminating, I won’t just sit there and listen to it.” And an upper secondary school teacher who first referred to people “who are a bit Danish People’s Party-like”, and then adjusted this to a reference to people with little or no education, said they had a completely different approach to life than her: “I look at things in a much more nuanced way than they do. Their world is very much black and white and
they often generalise a lot” (in Faber & Prieur 2013 p. 20). The ability to generalise and use stereotypes does not seem to be a privilege for the lower classes…

A Norwegian journalist, Marsdal (2008), has studied the Norwegian nationalist party (*Fremskrittspartiet* – the Progress Party) and accused the educated elite, supported by the Norwegian Labour Party, for pushing ordinary people in the arms of the nationalist party through their display of contempt not only for these ordinary people’s attitudes, but also for their lifestyles and cultural preferences. It is seen as perfectly legitimate to mock and ridicule habits like camping holidays, wearing of jogging suits, eating of fat food, giving American first names to ones kids etc – all habits, that are quite common within the traditional working class in Norway. It is also quite legitimate for educated people to declare that they hate people who vote for the Progress Party, and label them as racist and as egoistic – not minding that the Progress Party’s electorate actually is the economically poorest of all electorates.

Jarness (2013: 186) provides an example, when a head of a Norwegian cultural enterprise declares in an interview: “I want my children to become socially minded, and not egoists that dream of fat salaries and expensive cars. And I have forbidden my children to ever vote for the Progress Party. [Laughs]” That the Progress Party’s electorate must content themselves with dreaming about expensive cars, as they rarely can afford to drive them, is not recognized by the cultural elite.

These Scandinavian examples show that a cultural opposition may reinforce a political opposition. My next example will show that this opposition in other societies may be a profound cleavage. In Cveticanin and Popescu’s (2009, 2011) study from Serbia, based on a survey on cultural consumptions followed up with qualitative interviews, the authors identified a main opposition between on the one side three clusters: elite style (classical highbrow), elite omnivores, and (global) urban style, and on the other a cluster around folk style, and another labelled rural omnivores, where the two latter in particular fancy folk music and turbo-folk music – both according to a quite specific Serbian classification of styles. Serbian folk bears a certain mark of nostalgia and national romanticism, while the turbo-folk is a more hard-rock genre with songs in Serbian language, but with visual aesthetics in the spectre from Eurovision song contest to S&M porn. As the greatest turbo star is the widow of the deceased war lord and suspect of war crimes Erkan Raznatovic there is a clear link to Serbian nationalism. What is interesting – but also scaring – is how this opposition in musical taste links to the cleavages in Serbian society between the educated and the uneducated; the urban and the rural or recently urbanized; the more European north and the more oriental south, and between “cosmopolitans” and “patriots”. The former label themselves as “civilized” and the others as “primitive”, while the latter label themselves as the people and the others as alienated, inauthentic or feminine (gender stereotyping is always useful). So we see the stereotyping in play just like in the Danish case, but the consequences are bigger. The two groups live in completely separate cultural worlds, and the analysis thus reveals a profound cleavage in Serbian society. One might conclude with Bourdieu (at the back of the English translation of *Distinction*):”No judgment of taste is innocent.”
We see strong cleavages related to the opposition between a national and an international political orientation in countries like Greece and Hungary today, and it would be very interesting to know whether this cleavage is supported by oppositions in cultural preferences, like in Serbia, and like we see it in a softer version in Denmark and in Norway.

This dividing line may not be the same in countries like UK or France, where the national culture perhaps is more often seen in opposition to American culture, which is seen as more vulgar. And of course, the cultural elites in Serbia and in Aalborg do not regard the eating of hamburgers or the listening to Britney Spears as particularly cosmopolitan and sophisticated habits, a fact that clearly should draw the attention towards which features that are regarded as representing the international orientation. Denmark and Serbia have in common to be rather small countries. In contrast, the British study, just like Bourdieu’s French study, found older elites being predominantly oriented towards their national culture. Even so Bennett et al. (2009) found a “cosmopolitan cultural capital” circulating amongst younger age groups. Younger professionals show an interest in American cultural forms marking them out from their older peers who are more attracted to national, British, cultural forms. Here, they were drawn towards ‘quirkly’ Anglophone cultural forms, often from North America or Australasia, which they could venerate as non-snobbish yet also ‘cultic’. Thus programmes such as ER; ‘The Wire’, Friends and such like serve to define a form of contemporary cosmopolitan taste which is also nationally specific. This kind of cosmopolitanism implies replacing a more Eurocentric, ‘highbrow’ orientation with a more Anglophone orientation.

I will end this part with a discussion of the problem of naming. I have a fear that the wrong naming of the opposition may contribute to a reinforcement of it. The term cosmopolitan can be defined as ”belonging to all parts of the world, not restricted to any country or its inhabitants”, but its connotations are less neutral. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ seems actually to be chosen by the elites to quite complacently designate themselves. To label the one side of the opposition cosmopolitan is risky as this term has very positive connotations, to being modern, international, tolerant, open-minded etc., whereby the non-cosmopolitan must be traditional, local, intolerant and narrow-minded. As Calhoun has lined out in his article “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism.” (the title says it all, doesn’t it …): “Cosmopolitan discourse too easily encourages the equation of the global with the modern and the national or local with the backwardly traditional.” (find page ref,). Calhoun ends with “a plea for the local and particular – not least as a basis for democracy” and warns that ”Cosmopolitanism without the strengthening of local democracy is likely to be a very elite affair”.

I am not sure where this leads me. Perhaps to regret that Mike and I chose the term “cosmopolitan cultural capital” for this tendency – may be international would have been better than cosmopolitan, a bit less loaded at least, but perhaps not sufficiently precise. It should be remembered that the choice of terms is linked to values, and at least, instead of labelling the “others” as stuck and narrow-minded, we should perhaps recognize the values expressed in their orientations, which could be loyalty, authenticity, stability etc. (cf Skeggs 2004 here – to be added) I sincerely believe that the construction of categories is the main form for exercise of power that we sociologists have, and this power should be handled with caution.
Conclusion

Our examination of research on cultural consumptions leaves no doubt that class structured cultural differences prevail, even if classical high culture enjoys a more marginal status than before. We need to move away from the view that because we cannot identify ‘highbrow’ culture in the way that it appears in Distinction, cultural capital does not exist. The identification of distinguishing practices and preferences does not, however, necessarily turn these attributes into cultural capital. For an asset to serve as a capital in a bourdieusian sense, it should be linked to legitimacy, convertibility and domination, and this link has to be shown. It is not given that the cultural specificities of the highly educated like the ones here mentioned enjoy any wider recognition as good taste, and it is not given that they may be converted to social or economic capital. Neither is it given that they may be experienced as linked to domination. But all this is possible – it demands, however, more research on the other social classes, on their experiences and attitudes. And it seems quite evident, in any case, that such features may serve in processes of social closure, as people who resemble each other in matters of both social position and cultural positioning practices will tend to lump together: settling in the same neighbourhoods, marrying each other, choosing the same schools for their children etc. For this reason, taste is not innocent.

An overview of the research has brought a lot of interesting ideas about the new or emerging ways the privileged may distinguish themselves. Although the concept of cultural omnivore correctly points to limitations of the traditional ‘highbrow’ model, there may be some more interesting distinguishing practices linked to a knowing, distanced or verbalized, appropriation of culture and to the so-called cosmopolitan attitudes and preferences. If Mike and I are right in designating these features as important new forms of cultural capital, there is a need to look in greater detail at the way that a ‘knowing mode of appropriation of culture’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘international’ taste can circulate in powerful and pervasive forms through new technological forms, and in various kinds of ‘popular’ culture.

Literature


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